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This study analyzes perceived corruption following privatization reforms, taking into account the role of
governance quality in 22 European countries from 2002 to 2013. Initial analysis did not reveal significant
changes in perceived corruption after privatization reforms, but the results are moderated by governance
quality. In general, the empirical findings suggest that corruption is lower when the quality of governance
increases, and it additionally affects perceived corruption after privatization reforms. Concretely, account-
ability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and control of corruption mechanisms
are essential to prevent corruption after privatization.
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R E S U M E N
Este estudio analiza la corrupción percibida tras las reformas de privatización, teniendo en cuenta el papel
del buen gobierno, en 22 países europeos entre 2002 y 2013. Un primer análisis inicial no revela cambios
relevante en la corrupción percibida después de las reformas de privatización, pero estos resultados son
moderados por la calidad del gobierno (governance). En general, los resultados empíricos sugieren que
la corrupción es menor cuando el nivel de buen gobierno se incrementa, el cual afecta a la corrupción
percibida después de que se llevan a cabo privatizaciones de empresas públicas. Concretamente, la
rendición de cuentas, la efectividad del gobierno en la aplicación de políticas públicas, la calidad de la
regulación, el Estado de Derecho, y los mecanismos de control de la corrupción son esenciales para su
prevención tras las reformas de privatización.
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1. Introduction
Over the past few decades an extensive literature has de-
veloped on the causes and consequences of privatization re-
forms. Collectively, this body of literature tends to emphas-
ize gains in efficiency, effectiveness, andmanagement flexibil-
ity (Megginson and Netter, 2001), boosting economic growth
(Boubakri, Smaoui, and Zmmiti, 2009a), and reducing public
deficits and debt (Bortolotti, Fantani, and Siniscalco, 2003).
However, some scholars have concluded that privatization
has been carried out more to enhance efficiency than equity,
and it has worsened the distribution of wealth and income
on average (Birdsall and Nellis, 2003).
Moreover, privatization has also been related to corruption,
defined as the abuse of public office for private gain (Zekos,
2004). Unfortunately, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are
usually viewed as susceptible to such abuse. Politicians and
civil servants are able to exert influence on SOEs’ corporate
decisions with the aim of achieving dishonest private rents
or outsiders’ gains in exchange for bribes (Arikan, 2008).
Thus, privatization could be viewed as a mechanism for redu-
cing the opportunities to extract rents (Kaufmann and Siegel-
baum, 1997).
However, the payment of bribes to obtain favored treat-
ment on concessions, contracts, and privatization deals is
more common than desired. Even after privatization, polit-
ical connections remain. In many cases, privatization re-
forms do not result in the liberalization of markets and sec-
tors, but rather concentration in large and powerful compan-
ies, with strong political connections.
These conflicting results raise questions concerning the
role some factors may play in moderating the relationship
between privatization and corruption. Contextual factors,
such as legal origin (La Porta, Lopéz-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and
Vishny, 1999), are critical in public management, and more
concretely in privatization decisions (e.g., Bortolotti, Fantini,
and Siniscalco, 2001; Bortolotti et al., 2003). This study goes
beyond legal origin to consider a broader concept, namely
“governance,” which takes into account not only the legal sys-
tem but also other aspects of economic, political, and admin-
istrative authority involved in managing a country’s affairs
at all levels (United Nations Development Program [UNDP],
1997). Corruption is often symptomatic of governance prob-
lems (Zekos, 2004) and thus privatization reforms will not
produce the expected results under poor governance.
Accordingly, the aim of this study is to analyze perceived
corruption after privatization reforms, taking into account
the role of the quality of governance. For this purpose,
privatization is defined as the sale of SOEs by a government.
The sample consists of 22 European countries for the period
2002–2013. Initial analysis shows no significant changes in
corruption perception after privatization reforms, but the res-
ults change when the quality of governance is taken into ac-
count. In general, the findings indicate that corruption is
lower when the quality of governance increases, and it ad-
ditionally affects perceived corruption after privatization re-
forms. Specifically, accountability, government effectiveness,
regulatory quality, the rule of law, and control of corruption
mechanisms are essential to prevent corruption after privat-
ization.
The paper therefore begins with a literature review on
the relation between privatization and corruption before fo-
cusing on the concept of governance and proposing a hypo-
thesis. It then describes the sample and variables, including
the model that enables empirical testing of the hypothesis.
The results show the link between privatization and corrup-
tion, taking into account the role of the quality of governance.
These results are discussed and the paper then concludes
with some implications of the findings, especially for prac-
titioners.
2. Literature Review: Privatization and Corruption
Theoretically, Kaufmann and Siegelbaum (1997) sugges-
ted that privatization incorporates different factors that may
stimulate or hinder potential corruption, namely, speed, level
of administrative discretion, transparency, and independence
of administration. When privatization is undertaken quickly,
there is less time to arrange corruption transactions; when
the process of granting the official signature to pass privat-
ization is subjective, it is easier for discretionary payments
to occur. Also, payments are facilitated by secrecy, so public
scrutiny is essential to avoid corruption, and using special-
ized agencies to implement privatization makes it easier to
monitor transactions. Thus, privatization may reduce the op-
portunities for public officials to extract rents under specific
conditions.
Empirically, Koyuncu, Ozturkler, and Yilmaz (2010) iden-
tified a negative association between privatization and cor-
ruption using a sample of 27 transition economies over the
period 19952008, and concluded that privatization reduces
corruption in transition economies. Similarly, Clarke and
Xu (2004) found that bribes are lower in countries where
telecommunications and electricity distribution utilities have
been privatized, employing a sample of (21) transition eco-
nomies from Eastern Europe and Asia for the year 1999.
Boubakri, Cosset, and Smaoui (2009b) used a larger
sample, comprising both developing and developed coun-
tries, analyzed over the period 19842001. Their findings sug-
gest that the progress and volume of privatization reduce the
risk of corruption in developed countries. However, the evid-
ence is not so clear in the case of developing countries, in
which public-share privatization also reduces the risk of cor-
ruption, but large-scale privatization increases the risk. Thus,
the negative link between privatization and corruption could
be questioned. In addition, building a simple positive the-
ory of privatization, Laffont and Meleu (1999) suggested a
relation between privatization and corruption that has an in-
verted U-shape, supporting the model with data from sub-
Saharan Africa.
There is also literature suggesting that corruption in-
creases with privatization reforms. First, the process of
privatization is itself susceptible to corruption, as Shleifer
(1999) indicates. According to public choice theory, the polit-
ical system is a market in which agents interact to attain their
own aims (Downs, 1957). Politicians especially are seen as
opportunistic agents who act seeking to gain power and thus
implement policies addressing this goal. Accordingly, they
may award contracts or sell SOEs to inefficient providers
in exchange for campaign contributions or bribes (Shleifer,
1999).
Bjorvvatn and Soreide (2005) suggest that privatization in
countries with highly corrupt governments will lead to high
market concentration, which translates into more corruption.
In many cases, privatization does not result in the liberal-
ization of markets, but rather the concentration of markets
in large companies, which not only have high market share,
but also maintain high access to and control over these mar-
kets. The effects of this progressive concentration and the
lessening of competition in bidding may come to outweigh
the gains from privatization (Bel and Costas 2006), leading
only to increased bribery and corruption.
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Grounded in empirical research, Arikan (2008) argues that
the process of privatization is notorious for causing corrup-
tion. Using data on privatizations in the 1990s, and con-
trolling for endogeneity problems, Arikan’s results suggest
that higher privatization leads to an increase in perceived cor-
ruption.
Thus, it is not clear whether the level of corruption in-
creases or decreases with privatization. This study aims
to contribute to clarifying this effect, explaining the hetero-
geneity of results through some contextual factors that may
moderate the relation. Concretely, it focuses on the role
of the quality of governance, following suggestion made by
Hodge (2002), who noted that privatization without good
governance leads to a corrupt state.
3. The Role of the Quality of Governance in Privatiza-
tion Decisions
Definition of Governance
Governance is a broad concept that inspires strong beliefs
and is difficult to measure (Isham, Kaufman, and Pritchett,
1997), and accordingly there is no unique definition. Ini-
tially, definitions of governance were focused on the manner
in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s
economic and social resources for development (World Bank,
1992); that is, the essence of this concept was the governing
mechanisms that do not rest on recourse to the authority and
sanctions of government (Stoker, 1998).
However, governance involves more than the government.
From a socio-political perspective, it involves different ar-
rangements in which public and private agents participate
with the aim of solving societal problems, creating new op-
portunities, and attending to institutions with governing
activities (Kooiman, 1999). It refers to the formation and
stewardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate
the arena in which the state and economic and societal actors
interact to make decisions (Hyden, Court, and Mease, 2004).
Despite the heterogeneity of definitions, in general there
is consensus that governance captures the way in which au-
thority is exercised, beyond the government, including rela-
tions between the state, civil society, and the private sector
(Al-Marhubi, 2004). Broadly, definitions of good governance
advocate openness, citizens’ participation, accountability, co-
herence in public policies, civic peace, interest representa-
tion, conflict resolution mechanisms, and so on, as essential
characteristics of governmental, non-governmental, and cor-
porate sector institutions (Batterbury and Fernando, 2006).
This study adopts the definition of Kaufmann, Kraay, and
Mastruzzi (2011), who consider governance as the traditions
and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised,
including: (i) the process by which governments are selec-
ted, monitored, and replaced; (ii) the capacity of the govern-
ment to undertake effective formulation and implementation
of sound policies; (iii) the respect of citizens and the state for
the institutions that govern economic and social interactions
among them. Kaufmann et al. (2011) use six indicators to
represent these three areas:
(i) Voice and accountability (VA) measures perceptions of
the extent to which citizens participate in the selection
of their government, freedom of expression and associ-
ation, and the existence of a free media.
(ii) Political stability and the absence of violence (PS) cap-
tures the likelihood of political instability and violence
(including terrorism); for example, it refers to armed
conflicts, social unrest, the intensity of ethnic, religious
or regional conflicts, government stability, and so on.
(iii) Government effectiveness (GE)measures the perception
of the quality of public services and policy formulation,
and the implementation and credibility of the govern-
ment’s commitment to such policies; for example, gov-
ernment effectiveness refers to the quality of bureau-
cracy, satisfaction with public transportation, roads, or
the education system, coverage of basic health services,
the power supply (electricity grid), drinking water, san-
itation, waste disposal, and so on.
(iv) Regulatory quality (RQ) refers to the perceptions of
the ability of the government to formulate and imple-
ment policies and regulations that permit and promote
private sector development (e.g., price controls, [lack
of] discriminatory tariffs and taxes, fairness of competit-
ive practices, burden of government regulations, intens-
ity of local competition, ease of starting new businesses,
anti-trust policy, investment, financial freedom, and so
on).
(v) Rule of law (RL) captures perceptions of confidence in
and adherence to the rules of society, particularly the
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the po-
lice, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime
and violence. For instance, it measures the cost of or-
ganized crime, the reliability of police services, judicial
independence, the efficiency of the legal framework for
challenging regulations, the extent of property rights,
the existence of violent crime, the enforceability of con-
tracts, the speediness of the judicial process, and so on.
(vi) Control of corruption (CC) captures perceptions of the
extent to which public power is used for private bene-
fits; for example, it refers to public trust in politicians,
diversion of public funds, irregular payments, unofficial
payments to public officials, extra payments in connec-
tion with taxes, customs, the judiciary, anti-corruption
policy, and the prosecution of abuse of office.
The two first indicators (VA and PS) refer to the process by
which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced;
GE and RQ refer to the capacity of the government to for-
mulate and implement policies effectively; the last two (RL
and CC) refer to respect of citizens and the state for the insti-
tutions that govern economic and social interactions among
them (Kaufmann et al., 2011).
The Moderating Role of the Quality of Governance: Research
Hypothesis
Traditionally, SOEs have been viewed as inefficient and sus-
ceptible to the abuse of public office for private aims (World
Bank, 1997), obtaining dishonest self-gain or outsider gain
in exchange for bribes (Arikan, 2008), and with low levels
of information disclosures (Royo, Yetano, and García-Lacalle,
2019). Privatization reforms have often been introduced
with the aim of improving economic efficiency by reducing
the role of the state and increasing the degree of private sec-
tor competition (Bjorvatn and Soreide, 2005). Thus, privat-
ization is usually seen as a way of reducing the opportun-
istic behaviors of public officials (Kaufmann and Siegelbaum,
1997), which lead to corruption cases.
This was the conservative view introduced by the Reagan
and Thatcher administrations from the early 1990s, namely
that the private sector would probably do better anything
that the public sector (government) could do. However, this
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conservative perspective does not have conclusive support in
terms of evidence. In many cases, privatization reforms have
not led to the liberalization of markets, but rather concentra-
tion in large and powerful companies that are connected with
public office (Arikan, 2008). The effects of this progressive
concentration and the decrease in bidding competition may
come to outweigh the gains from privatization (Bel and Cos-
tas, 2006), as they lead only to increased bribery and corrup-
tion.
The reality seems to be that companies sometimes pay
bribes to obtain favored treatment in contracts, concessions,
and privatization deals in general (Zekos, 2004). Thus, it
does not remove corruption, but it changes the “focus” of
the opportunistic behaviors; i.e., privatization may reduce
petty corruption (i.e., bribe payments to utility employees by
service-using firms), but it increases grand corruption, such
as bribe payments to government officials and bureaucrats
by utility managers (Clarke and Xu, 2004), and also includes
lack of transparency (Manzetti, 1999).
Starting from this position, good governance is essential
to shape the degree of corruption. Hodge (2002) states that
privatization without good governance leads to a corrupt
state. In countries where the market system is not deeply
rooted, the system of law is not enforced and state interven-
tion is invasive; bribes and payoff are used by companies to
achieve their goals (Zekos, 2004). The general principles of
governance (transparency, accountability, fairness, citizens’
participation, and the effective rule of law) play a significant
role in the fight against corruption.
Regarding the definition on which this study relies, control
of corruption is one of the six indicators of the quality of gov-
ernance. Clearly it is expected that this will affect corruption
after privatization reforms, but the other five indicators may
also affect the relation between privatization and corruption.
Indeed, Langbein and Knack (2010) and Andrews (2008)
note that the six indicators appear to say similar things in
different words, and they are causally related, especially in
terms of corruption.
Firstly, “voice and accountability” refers to transparency,
and freedom of expression and participation in government,
so it is conceptually related to hidden transactions, such as
those involved in some contracts, concessions, and privatiz-
ation deals (Zekos, 2004). Also, the “political stability” in-
dicator is crucial in terms of fighting corruption; when trans-
itions in government are decided based on long-lived rules,
they are more likely to have a longer time horizon, so it
is probable that public policies and investments will seek
growth and welfare instead of corrupt transfers (Langbein
and Knack, 2010). The third feature in the governance defin-
ition is “government effectiveness,” this being the extent of ef-
fective use of public resources for public aims, not for private
interests. “Regulatory quality” and the “rule of law” function
as incentive mechanisms to promote ethical behaviors and
control corruption (Zekos, 2004).
Thus, it is to be expected that corruption will be re-
duced after privatization reforms when the quality of the gov-
ernance is high; in contrast, corruption will persist (or may
even increase in some cases) after such reforms when gov-
ernance is not sufficiently strong. Accordingly, the following
hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis: The effect of privatization on perceived
corruption is moderated by the quality of governance.
4. Methodology
Sample
To test the proposed hypothesis, we use a sample con-
sisting of 22 European countries for the period 2002–2013,
leading to a panel dataset with 264 observations. The
countries included in the sample are Austria, Belgium, the
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (UK).
Information on privatization processes was obtained
from the Privatization Barometer, a project launched by
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), a non-profit and non-
partisan institution for the study of governance, powered
by KPMG Advisory. This is the official provider of privatiza-
tion data to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and the World Bank. The corruption
level was obtained from Transparency International, which
is a politically non-partisan organization, founded in 1993
to fight corruption and stop the abuse of power, bribery, and
secret deals. The quality of governance was obtained from
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project, which
reports governance indicators for over 200 countries over the
period 19962015 covering six dimensions, namely voice and
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness,
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.
Finally, other socio-economic and political data were ob-
tained from the OECD and the World Bank databases. Con-
cretely, these data refer to control variables, namely political
ideology, electoral processes, education level, economic de-
velopment, and openness of the economy. These variables
are described in the following section.
Variables
To test the hypothesis, the three main concepts are per-
ceived corruption, privatization transactions, and the quality
of governance. The former is the dependent variable (called
Proceeds) in our model of analysis, and it is represented by
the sum of privatization proceeds (US$ million) as a propor-
tion of gross domestic product (GDP) (Bortolotti et al., 2001;
2003; Zohlnhöfer, Obinger, and Wolf, 2008). This proxy
refers to revenues obtained from privatization, which is use-
ful in providing a measure of the willingness of governments
to privatize and the economic impact of such privatizations
(Bortolotti et al., 2003).
Corruption is represented by the Corruption Perceptions
Index (CPI), published by Transparency International, which
refers to the perceptions of business people and experts on
the level of corruption in the public sector. This index is ob-
tained using more than 10 different data sources from dif-
ferent institutions and represents perceptions of corruption.
These sources are standardized, taking values between 0 and
100, with 0 indicating the worst behavior (highest level of
perceived corruption) and 100 indicating the best behavior
(lowest level of perceived corruption). For each country, a
minimum of three data sources, obtained after the standard-
ization process, are required to obtain a value on the CPI.
The quality of governance is represented by the WGIs.
These consist of six composite indicators covering broad di-
mensions of the quality of governance, with data obtained
from 31 different data sources to capture governance percep-
tions among survey respondents, non-governmental organiz-
ations, commercial business information providers, and pub-
lic sector organizations all around the world (Kaufmann et
al., 2011). Data on perceptions of governance are grouped
into six clusters that represent “the traditions and institutions
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by which authority in a country is exercised” (Kaufmann et
al., 2011), namely: (i) voice and accountability (VA); (ii)
political stability and absence of violence (PS); (iii) govern-
ment effectiveness (GE); (iv) regulatory quality (RQ); (v)
rule of law (RL); (vi) control of corruption (CC).
The WGIs combine the views from surveys of different en-
terprises, citizens, and experts, on the basis of more than
30 data sources (survey institutes, international organiza-
tions, non-governmental organizations, enterprises, and so
on). First, they rescale the individual source data (0–1), and
then construct a weighted average of the individual indic-
ators for each source by using the unobserved components
model; the final values run from approximately -2.5 (the
worst quality of governance) to 2.5 (the best quality of gov-
ernance).
Finally, with the aim of avoiding biased results, the study
takes into account some control variables selected from
the previous literature on corruption (e.g., Arikan, 2008;
Boubakri et al., 2009b; Koyuncu et al., 2010): Growth is the
GDP (market prices) growth rate; education refers to the per-
centage of the population comprising secondary students en-
rolled in general education programs; openness refers to the
openness of the economy, and is measured as the aggregate of
imports and exports of goods and services (% of GDP); right
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for countries gov-
erned by parties that are defined as conservative, Christian
democratic, or right-wing, and 0 otherwise.
Models of Analysis
Taking the variables described above, the hypothesis is em-
pirically tested using the following models:
CPIit = β0 + β1Proceedsit + β2Growthit + β3Educationit +
β4Opennessit + β5Rightit +ηi + νit (1)
CPIit = β0 + α jWGI j it + β1Growthit + β2Educationit +
β3Opennessit + β4Rightit +ηi + νit (2)
CPIit = β0+α jWGI j it+γ jWGI j ∗Proceedsit+β1Growthit+
β2Educationit + β3Opennessit + β4Rightit +ηi + νit (3)
where the sub-indices i and t refer to the country and
year, respectively, and the variables are as previously defined;
WGIj represents each of the j indicators that represent the
quality of governance, with j = 1, . . . , 6, referring to VA, PS,
GE, RQ, RL, and CC, respectively.
The error term is broken down into two elements: i refers
to unobservable heterogeneity and it is the classic disturb-
ance term. The former refers to the particular characteristics
of each country included in the sample, which differ among
countries but are invariant over time. These characteristics
are difficult to measure because they are unobservable to re-
searchers; however, failing to take them into account could
bias the results.
Initially, a fixed- or random-effects estimator could be used
to estimate the models; however, the errors must be condi-
tionally homoskedastic and not serially correlated. Thus, we
first test whether our model presents heteroskedasticity and
serial correlation problems using the Breusch–Pagan test and
the Wooldridge test, respectively. The p-values obtained for
each test are lower than 0.05, which means that the null hy-
pothesis of the presence of homoskedastic errors must be re-
jected and that there are no serially correlated errors at the
95% confidence level.
In addition, an endogeneity problem also arises in themod-
els due to the causality between corruption and privatization
(Arikan, 2008; Koyuncu et al., 2010). Instrumental vari-
ables (IVs) might resolve that problem; however, the con-
ventional IV estimator, although consistent, is inefficient in
the presence of heteroskedasticity (Baum, Schaffer and Still-
man, 2003). In this situation, the dynamic panel estimator
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), which is based on
the generalized method of moments (GMM) introduced by
Hansen (1982), overcomes such limitation. Here, the two-
step system estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995), which
was implemented in Stata by Roodman (2009), is used. The
system estimator augments the initial difference GMM estim-
ator (Arellano and Bond, 1991), making the additional as-
sumption that the first differences of IV are not correlated
with the fixed effects, which improves efficiency.
The GMM estimators use the lagged values of the right-
hand side variables included in the model as instruments.
The instruments are lagged values of endogenous and pre-
determined variables. They are not correlated with the er-
ror term when deriving the estimator, as Arellano and Bond
(1991) demonstrated. The number of instruments should not
be very large in relation to the number of observations be-
cause the results could be biased; however, the higher the
number of instruments the higher the level of efficiency. The
most adequate instruments are the closest lags, as the fur-
thest cannot contain information on the current value of the
variables. The closest lags in the system GMM estimator are
t-1 and t for the endogenous and pre-determined variables
(Pindado and Requejo, 2015).
5. Results
Descriptive Analysis
First, some descriptive analyses are presented to provide
information on the variables entered into the models. Table
1 shows the main statistics, such as the mean, standard de-
viation, minimum and maximum values. The mean value of
CPI is 65.64, ranging from 0 to 100, and this value is more or
less stable along the period of analysis, as illustrated in Figure
1; there is only a slight decrease from 2007, which suggests
an increase in the corruption level perceived by citizens coin-
ciding with the crisis period. However, there are significant
differences between the sample countries: The minimum is
34 for Greece in 2011 and Poland in 2005, and the maximum
is 97 for Finland from 2002 to 2005. Moreover, Figure 2
shows the mean value by country, illustrating that Greece has
the worst values throughout the period (20022013); Finland
and Denmark are in the best position with values of around
95 over the period.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CPI 264 65.64 17.97 34 97 
Proceeds 264 0.0812 0.1504 0 1.0851 
VA 264 1.2003 0.2751 0.6538 1.8264 
PS 264 0.7995 0.3918 -0.4656 1.6649 
GE 264 1.2635 0.5517 0.2136 2.3566 
RQ 264 1.2837 0.3578 0.4900 1.9209 
RL 264 1.2068 0.5202 0.2392 1.9996 
CC 264 1.1379 0.7943 -0.2546 2.5527 
Growth 264 0.2935 2.1889 -0.9854 28.6121 
Education 260 6.4010 1.5687 4.1177 12.0337 
Openness 264 49.9639 18.5002 22.9079 89.6232 
Right 264 0.3106 0.4636 0 1 
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Figure 1
Evolution of Corruption PerceptionFigure 1. Evolution of Corruption Perception 
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There are also differences regarding privatization reforms.
The “proceeds” variable is measured by the ratio of reven-
ues obtained from privatization transactions (US$ million) to
GDP per capita. Themean value is 0.0812, but it reaches 1.08
in the case of France in 2005, where privatization reforms ac-
counted for US$37,847.64 million due to the sold part of the
capital of Societé des Autoroutes du Nord et de l’Est de la France
(SANEF), Snecma, France Telecom, Gaz de France (GdF), and
Electricité de France (EdF). Clearly there are also some obser-
vations in the sample with the value 0 in the case of countries
where there are no transactions in some years. Indeed, there
is no clear trend, either in monetary terms or in the number
of transactions, as can be seen from Figure 3: 2010 was the
year in which more transactions were carried out, although
these were not very significant in monetary terms in compar-
ison to 2005, when privatization reforms accounted for more
than US$3.5 billion.
It is important to take into account that privatization re-
forms are represented by revenues with the aim of measuring
the economic relevance of such reforms. Although the num-
ber of transactions could be large, these transactions could be
less relevant in monetary terms. For example, Figure 4 shows
that Poland has a high number of transactions (15 on aver-
age), but these are not so relevant in monetary terms, reach-
ing US$2,720.36 million. In contrast, although France has
a lower number of transactions than Poland (7 in the period
20022013), it is the country with the most significant privat-
ization reforms in monetary terms, reaching US$13,593.12
million.
Figure 3
Evolution of Privatization ReformsFigure 3. Evolution of Privatization Reforms 
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Figure 4
Privatization Reforms by CountryFigure 4. Privatization Reforms by Country 
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Deals Proceeds 
Regarding the WGIs, the best mean values are for RQ
(1.28) and GE (1.26), ranging from -2.5 to 2.5. What is
more, the maximum for GE is 2.35, achieved by Denmark
in 2007. This indicates that a high perception of government
effectiveness among Danish citizens, thanks to good quality
of services, strong credibility in terms of public policies, good
quality policy formulation and implementation, and so on. In
contrast, Italy shows the worst values for perceived govern-
ment effectiveness. However, GE is not the indicator with the
worst mean value; PS in Spain shows the minimum values,
especially between 2007 and 2010, indicating high political
instability; also Greece in the period 2009 to 2013 shows neg-
ative mean values for PS.
Finally, the descriptive statistics for the control variables
are also shown. The annual growth rate is 0.29% on aver-
age, although it reaches 28% in Slovenia and Lithuania in
2013. The percentage of the population comprising second-
ary students enrolled in general education programs is 6.4 on
average, falling to 4.11% in Slovenia in 2012, and reaching
12% in Lithuania over the period of analysis. Regarding the
variable “openness,” the mean value suggests that imports
account for about 50% GDP, although there are significant
differences between countries; in Italy, imports are 2223%
of GDP, while Irish and Slovak imports account for 8889% of
GDP. Finally, the dummy variable “right” has a mean value
of 0.31, indicating that 31% observations are governed by
conservative parties.
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Table 2
Bivariate Correlations Table 2. Bivariate Correlations 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. CPI 1 
           2. Proceeds -0.0983 1             
    3. VA 0.9152*** -0.0396 1           
    4. PS 0.4357*** -0.2053*** 0.4693*** 1 
   
  
    5. GE 0.9356*** -0.0877 0.9071*** 0.471*** 1 
  
  
    6. RQ 0.8572*** -0.1381* 0.8436*** 0.4382*** 0.855*** 1 
 
  
    7. RL 0.9461*** -0.0862 0.9073*** 0.4386*** 0.9383*** 0.8804*** 1   
    8. CC 0.9751*** -0.0841 0.935*** 0.4438*** 0.9495*** 0.8671*** 0.9597*** 1 
    9. Growth -0.0296 -0.0546 -0.058 0.0381 -0.0368 -0.0811 -0.0296 -0.0445 1       
10. Education -0.2124*** 0.0186 -0.2694*** -0.0458 -0.1859** -0.0314 -0.2088*** -0.205*** 0.0016 1 
 
  
11. Openness -0.1638** -0.3319*** -0.199** 0.3043*** -0.1402* -0.0261 -0.1607** -0.2051*** 0.1464* 0.074 1   
12. Right -0.1023† -0.0492 -0.0427 -0.1214* -0.095 -0.1221* -0.0681 -0.0587 -0.0654 -0.0052 -0.1657** 1 
Notes: 
CPI denotes the corruption perception index; proceeds represents revenues obtained from privatization transactions; VA refers to the “voice and accountability” indicator from the 
WGI research dataset; PS refers to the “political stability and absence of violence” indicator from the WGI research dataset; GE refers to the “government effectiveness” indicator from 
the WGI research dataset; RQ refers to the “regulatory quality” indicator from the WGI research dataset; RL refers to the “rule of law” indicator from the WGI research dataset; CC 
refers to the “control of corruption” indicator from the WGI research dataset; growth represents the GDP annual growth rate; education is measured by the secondary enrolment rate; 
openness is measured by current imports as a percentage of GDP; and “right” is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for right-wing governments and 0 otherwise. 
***, **, *, and † represent statistical significance at 99.9%, 99%, 95%, and 90%, respectively. 
 
Table 2 shows bivariate correlations among all the vari-
ables entered into themodels. The highest values are showed
for correlations between WGIs, but this does not generate
multicollinearity problems as they are individually entered
into the models. The rest of the coefficients are not so high,
with only “openness” presenting a relative link with “pro-
ceeds” and PS; moreover, these coefficients are around 0.3,
which is not very problematic in statistical terms. Further-
more, to ensure multicollinearity does not arise in the mod-
els, variance inflation factors (VIFs) were calculated for each
estimated model, the results1 suggesting that the predictor
variables are not highly correlated.
Exploratory Analysis
The results obtained by estimating model (1) are shown in
Table 3. The “proceeds” variable positively affects CPI, but it
is not statistically significant. Thus, for the European sample
between 2002 and 2013, no significant changes in corruption
perceptions after privatization reforms are found. Regarding
the control variables, all are statistically significant. “Growth”
positively affects CPI, so the higher the economic growth rate,
the higher the level of CPI (i.e., lower perceived corruption).
“Education” and “openness” also positively affect the depend-
ent variable; thus, education seems to reduce corruption and
an open economy is less prone to corruption. Finally, the
dummy variable “right” shows a negative coefficient, indic-
ating that conservative governments tend to be placed in a
lower position in the ranking of Transparency International,
so they tend to have a higher level of perceived corruption.
However, as hypothesized, the relationship between cor-
ruption and privatizationmay be affected by some contextual
factors, and more specifically by the quality of governance.
Thus, first the study tested whether governance indicators af-
fect the level of perceived corruption (model (2)), and then
whether such indicators act as moderating factors (model
(3)).
The results from model (2) are shown in Table 4, from
which it is apparent that the six WGIs positively affect the
dependent variable, suggesting that the higher the level of
these indicators, the higher the value of CPI. According to the
definition of variables, these results indicate that perceived
corruption is lower when the quality of governance increases.
1The results are not included to conserve space, but they are available
upon request.
Table 3
Effect of Privatization Reforms on Corruption PerceptionTable 3. Effect of Privatization Reforms on Corruption Perception  
 
Coef. Std. Err. 
Proceeds 0.1937 0.2367 
Growth 0.0768** 0.0263 
Education 0.2428*** 0.0502 
Openness 0.0372*** 0.0063 
Right -0.6299*** 0.1007 
Cons. 10.0040*** 0.6555 
Arellano−Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences  Prob > z =  0.222 
Hansen test of overriding 
restrictions  Prob > chi2 =  0.552 
Notes: 
Dependent variable: CPI refers to the Corruption Perceptions Index. 
Independent variable: “Proceeds” represents revenues obtained from 
privatization transactions. 
Control variables: “growth” represents the GDP annual growth rate; 
“education” is measured by the secondary enrolment rate; “openness” is 
measured by current imports as a percentage of GDP; “right” is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 for right-wing governments and 
0 otherwise. 
***, **, *, and † represent statistical significance at 99.9%, 99%, 95%, 
and 90%, respectively. 
 It is logical to expect such an effect in the case of CC, but the
empirical findings suggest the same relationship in the case of
“voice and accountability,” “political stability,” “government
effectiveness,” “regulatory quality,” and “the rule of law.”
Regarding the control variables, in general the results are
in line with those obtained for the first modelthat is, per-
ceived corruption is lower in the case of economic growth, a
higher level of education, and openness of the economy, and
it increases in countries governed by conservative parties.
After testing the effect of WGIs on perceived corruption,
Table 5 shows the results for model (3), in which interaction
terms between “proceeds” and the six governance indicators
are entered. In the first column, it is apparent that “proceeds”
negatively affects CPI (coef. = -10.7983, p < 0.001), which
suggests that perceived corruption increases after monetar-
ily relevant privatization reforms. Here, there is a statistic-
ally significant change in perceived corruption after privat-
ization, but the effect is moderated by the extent to which
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government,
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Table 4
Effect of WGI on Corruption PerceptionTable 4. Effect of WGI on Corruption Perception 	
 
Voice and 
accountability 
Political stability and 
absence of violence 
Government 
effectiveness 
 Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
VA 4.0441*** 0.3024     
PS   2.2950*** 0.3313   
GE     2.9592*** 0.2529 
Growth 0.0086 0.0180 -0.0039 0.0142 -0.0019 0.0113 
Education 0.2405*** 0.0550 0.2774*** 0.0382 0.1668*** 0.0363 
Openness 0.0081* 0.0033 0.0369*** 0.0044 0.0014 0.0019 
Right -0.2894** 0.0889 -0.5596** 0.1575 -0.0926 0.0658 
Cons. 3.7809*** 0.4884 8.4519*** 0.2598 3.8813*** 0.5106 
Arellano-Bond 
test for AR(2) 
in first 
differences  
Prob > z =  0.384 Prob > z =  0.256 Prob > z =  0.389 
Hansen test of 
overriding 
restrictions  
Prob > chi2 =  
0.666 Prob > chi2 =  1.000 Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
 Regulatory quality Rule of law Control of corruption 
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
RQ 3.5644*** 0.6140     
RL   3.3456*** 0.2784   
CC     2.6154*** 0.2488 
Growth 0.0418† 0.0238 0.0045 0.0045 0.0154* 0.0056 
Education 0.2386*** 0.0325 0.0032 0.0317 0.0868* 0.0373 
Openness 0.0134** 0.0040 -0.0011 0.0015 0.0062* 0.0026 
Right -0.1627† 0.0791 -0.1765*** 0.0394 -0.1530** 0.0522 
Cons. 4.2191*** 0.9594 2.6355*** 0.4751 3.8801*** 0.3077 
Arellano−Bond 
test for AR(2) 
in first 
differences  
Prob > z =  0.586 Prob > z =  0.219 Prob > z =  0.244 
Hansen test of 
overriding 
restrictions  
Prob > chi2 =  
1.000 Prob > chi2 =  1.000 Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
Notes: 
Dependent variable: CPI refers to the Corruption Perceptions Index. 
Independent variables: VA refers to the “voice and accountability” indicator from the WGI 
research dataset; PS refers to the “political stability and absence of violence” indicator from 
the WGI research dataset; GE refers to the “government effectiveness” indicator from the 
WGI research dataset; RQ refers to the “regulatory quality” indicator from the WGI 
research dataset; RL refers to the “rule of law” indicator from the WGI research dataset; CC 
refers to the “control of corruption” indicator from the WGI research dataset. 
Control variables: “Growth” represents the GDP annual growth rate; “education” is 
measured by the secondary enrolment rate; “openness” is measured by current imports as 
a percentage of GDP; “right” is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for right-wing 
governments and 0 otherwise. 
***, **, *, and † represent statistical significance at 99.9%, 99%, 95%, and 90%, 
respectively. 	 as well as the extent of freedom of expression and associ-
ation (that is the “voice and accountability” indicator). As
the interaction term is positive in this case (coef. = 7.3778,
p < 0.001), this feature of governance cuts off the increase
in perceived corruption after privatization reforms. In other
words, accountability, as a key aspect of good governance,
may prevent corruption after privatization.
Although the second column does not show statistical rel-
evance for perceived political stability, previous results are
similar in the case of GE, RQ, and RL, and also partially for
CC. More specifically, in the third column “proceeds” exerts
a negative impact on CPI (coef. = -3.9748, p < 0.05), but is
moderated by the interaction term, which positively affects
the dependent variable (coef. = 4.2159, p< 0.01). This find-
ing again suggests that perceived corruption increases after
privatization, except in the case of countries with high gov-
ernment effectiveness.
Similarly, regulatory quality is a moderator of the relation-
ship between privatization and corruption, which again is
negative in this equation (coef. = -3.2595, p < 0.05); the
interaction term positively affects CPI (coef. = 2.7151, p <
0.05), preventing the increase of corruption after monetar-
ily relevant privatization reforms. Also the rule of law is a
moderator: The “proceeds” variable shows a negative effect
on CPI (coef. = 2.3155, p < 0.05), but the interaction term
is positive (coef. = 1.7826, p < 0.1), which indicates that
confidence in and abiding by the rules of society, contract
enforcement, property rights, policy, and the courts may pre-
vent corruption after privatization.
Finally, CC would be expected to show significant results.
It can be observed that although the “proceeds” variable has
a negative coefficient, it is not statistically significant; how-
ever, the interaction term again positively affects CPI (coef.
= 0.5136, p < 0.05). This finding is extremely relevant
because it means that policies against corruption are a key
factor in preventing opportunistic behaviors on the part of
public powers for private gain. Indeed, privatization does
not exert an effect on corruption when the quality of such
policies increases.
Regarding the control variables, the results are similar
to those obtained for previous models, suggesting that eco-
nomic growth, education, and the openness of economy may
be useful in reduce perceived corruption, but this increases
in countries governed by conservative parties.
Table 5
Moderating Effects of WGI on the Effect of Privatization on Corruption
PerceptionTable 5. Moderating Effects of WGI on the Effect of Privatization on Corruption Perception 
 
 
Voice and 
accountability 
Political stability and 
absence of violence 
Government 
effectiveness 
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
Proceeds -10.7983*** 2.1021 -0.3093 0.6886 -3.9748* 1.4515 
WGIj 3.8081*** 0.4758 1.2406*** 0.3394 2.6289*** 0.2131 
Proceed*WGIj 7.3778*** 1.6284 1.0187 1.2662 4.2159** 1.4264 
Growth 0.0114 0.0343 -0.0097 0.0196 0.0756* 0.0322 
Education 0.1562** 0.0457 0.3988*** 0.0726 0.3292*** 0.0518 
Openness 0.0030 0.0031 0.0358*** 0.0076 0.0046 0.0030 
Right -0.3751** 0.1066 -0.5959** 0.1749 -0.0292 0.0922 
Cons. 3.3904*** 0.7596 10.2992*** 0.8101 5.0854*** 0.4043 
Arellano−Bond 
test for AR(2) in 
first differences  
Prob > z =  0.411 Prob > z =  0.158 Prob > z =  0.099 
Hansen test of 
overriding 
restrictions  
Prob > chi2 =  0.757 Prob > chi2 =  0.998 Prob > chi2 =  0.793 
 Regulatory quality Rule of law 
Control of 
corruption 
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
Proceed -3.2595* 1.5057 -2.3155* 0.9143 -0.2530 0.3063 
WGIj 3.1986*** 0.4173 2.6634*** 0.2563 1.8557*** 0.0794 
Proceed*WGIj 2.7151* 1.3054 1.7826† 0.9361 0.5136* 0.2294 
Growth 0.0443*** 0.0101 0.0229 0.0289 0.0255† 0.0129 
Education 0.4073*** 0.0482 0.0110 0.0268 0.2240*** 0.0560 
Openness 0.0253*** 0.0044 0.0130** 0.0038 0.0065* 0.0026 
Right -0.2688* 0.1146 -0.2360*** 0.0494 -0.1974** 0.0582 
Cons. 6.3389*** 0.9481 4.0343*** 0.4081 6.2238*** 0.4866 
Arellano−Bond 
test for AR(2) in 
first differences  
Prob > z =  0.074 Prob > z =  0.145 Prob > z =  0.474 
Hansen test of 
overid. 
restrictions  
Prob > chi2 =  0.786 Prob > chi2 =  0.575 Prob > chi2 =  0.358 
Notes: 
Dependent variable: CPI refers to the Corruption Perceptions Index. 
Independent variables: “Proceeds” represents revenues obtained from privatization 
transactions; WGIj refers to j indicators of the “quality of governance,” namely “voice 
and accountability,” “political stability and absence of violence,” “government 
effectiveness,” “regulatory quality,” “rule of law,” and “control of corruption”; 
Proceed*WGIj is the interaction term between “proceeds” and each of the cited WGI 
indicators. 
Control variables: “Growth” represents the GDP annual growth rate; “education” is 
measured by the secondary enrolment rate; “openness” is measured by current 
imports as a percentage of GDP; “right” is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 
for right-wing governments and 0 otherwise. 
***, **, *, and † represent statistical significance at 99.9%, 99%, 95%, and 90%, 
respectively. 
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6. Discussion and Conclusions
Although the association between privatization and cor-
ruption is not clear, the findings of this study make a relevant
contribution in relation to the previous literature by taking
on board the influence of the quality of governance. This
study regards good governance as a means of helping coun-
tries, on the one hand, to achieve sustainable and self-reliant
development and social justice, and on the other hand, op-
erating most effectively and efficiently. For that, we adopt
the definition of Kaufmann et al. (2011) and their six indic-
ators to represent good governance as a group of different
factors that may influence on the corruption perceived after
privatization reforms (Kaufman and Siegelbaum, 1997).
Our findings throw light on the relevance of the context
in explaining corruption perception. The empirical evidence
indicates that corruption is lower when the quality of the gov-
ernance is higher, and this also affects perceived corruption
after privatization reforms. Specifically, accountability, gov-
ernment effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and
control of corruptionmechanisms are essential to prevent cor-
ruption after privatization. This is in line with Hodge (2002),
who states that privatization without good governance leads
to a corrupt state.
Some analysis shows no statistically significant effects of
privatizations on perceived corruption, probably because the
final effect is not evident per se. Kaufman and Sielgelbaum
(1997) suggest that privatization incorporates some factors
(e.g., speed, level of administrative discretion, information
transparency level, and independency of administration) that
may stimulate or hinder the potential corruption associated
with such reforms. Because of this, the literature is hetero-
geneous in this respect; for instance, while Koyuncu et al.
(2010) and Clarke and Xu (2004) conclude that privatiza-
tion reduces corruption in transition economies, other schol-
ars have questioned the negative link between privatization
and corruption (e.g., Boubakri et al., 2009b).
Our findings partially clear such doubts by considering the
role of the quality of governance. First, the process of privat-
ization is itself susceptible to corruption as politicians are
seen as opportunistic agents, on the basis of the public choice
theory (Buchanan, 2009). Trying tomaximize their ownwell-
being rather than that of the public (“self-interest axiom”;
Boyne, 1997), politicians may award contracts or sell SOEs
to inefficient providers in exchange for campaign contribu-
tions or bribes (Shleifer, 1999). In order to combat corrup-
tion coming from privatization reforms, good governance is
essential.
Corruption generates a vicious circle, and an enormous im-
pact on different economic features and social issues. Lack
of confidence in government may result in political and eco-
nomic instability, or in a lack of confidence on the part of
foreign investors, which is essential for privatization. This
can result in a reputational risk, which has the potential to
cause macroeconomic distortions, as well as the misalloca-
tion of capital and resources, increasing the risks in the finan-
cial sector, and finally hurting the credibility and integrity of
the government in general (Campos, Pradhan, and Recanat-
ini, 2007).
In addition, the results of this study encourage the private
sector not only to make the best use of good governance
practices, but also to be helpful in raising awareness among
the public about the importance of strengthening good gov-
ernance practices. The enforcement of principles of good
governance is necessary from both sides to ensure that high-
powered politicians and private corporations will be subject
to the same standards (Campos et al., 2007). If enforcement
is rigorous, it is more likely that perceived corruption will be
reduced after significant privatization reforms. This makes
it necessary to emphasize tools and strategies that improve
the accountability and restore citizens’ trust (Montesinos and
Brusca, 2019).
Finally, it would be interesting for future studies to cover
other regions, such as Latin America or Asia, to contrast the
relevant contributions of this paper regarding the influence of
good governance on perceived corruption after privatization
reforms. Also, it could be interesting to represent good gov-
ernance using other indicators, and extending these results
to other moderating factors, such as the level of democracy,
accounting systems in the public sector, the development of
financial systems, and so on. Moreover, the quality of gov-
ernance may also moderate the effect of privatization in rela-
tion to social issues, e.g., welfare, unemployment, or income
inequality, among others.
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